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There has been considerable concern over the polarization of
American politics in recent decades.' Bipartisanship seems to many
to have hit a low. And the partisanship stands in the way of many
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worthy projects. More, political scientists have described the role of
sharp political cleavages in the destruction of numerous
democracies. 2 Excessive partisanship can be very corrosive.
What is less realized is the role that law has played in creating the
partisan environment that many denounce. These changes have
involved parallel trends in the law of political campaigns and
elections and the law of mass communications. This article brings
together many of the changes taking place in the law regulating
American politics and identifies the collective impact of those
changes.
Two caveats are essential. First, there are many good reasons for
the individual changes. There is no mythic golden age to which to
return. Politics has been nasty and dirty both before and after these
changes. 3 The rules have played favorites, protecting some politicians
and certain political ideas, both before and after these changes. At
one level they are only a different set of favorites. But since law
governs the type of politics we have, it is important to see what it is
doing and how.
Second, I do not wish to be understood as claiming that other
factors have had no impact on the polarization in American politics.
It is too early to know how much the recent presidential campaign,
for example, may change American politics. Nor do I attempt in these
pages to assess the shares that might be assigned to different causes.
But this article does assert that any attempt to understand what has
taken place without identifying the relevant legal changes is
drastically incomplete.
2. See NANCY BERMEO, ORDINARY PEOPLE IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: THE CITIZENRY AND THE
BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRACY (2003); THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES (Juan J. Linz &
Alfred Stepan, eds., 1984).
3. Compare the wild allegations of Senator Joseph McCarthy and others in the 1950s, see 3 ERIC
BARNOUW, THE IMAGE EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 8-21, 37-40,
46-56 (1970); WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF
AMERICA 1932-1972, 489-99, 520-30 (1975), with the impeachment efforts against presidents of both
parties later in the century. There has been a recent outpouring of scholarship on the McCarthy era. See
generally DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR (1978); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION:
FREE EXPRESSION AND THE MCCARTHY ERA 140 (2005); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES
(1998). The overbreadth of the blacklists is evident in the text. See AM. BUS. CONSULTANTS, RED
CHANNELS 9 (1950); 2 ERIK BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE
UNITED STATES 266-67 (1968).
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LAW AND POLARIZATION OF POLITICS
Part II will describe changes in the law. Part IIA will examine
changes to media law, including changes in federal licensing and
liability rules and will conclude with discussion of parallel changes in
journalists' practices. Part 1113 will describe changes in the law of
political campaigns, including nominations, districting, and financial
rules.4
Part III brings these together and describes relevant warnings from
other disciplines about the impact on American democracy.5 Part IV
makes suggestions for the law of mass communications and the law
of election campaigns.
6
I. COMPLAINTS ABOUT POLARIZATION
The report of the Pew Research Center For The People & The
Press found "[t]he extraordinary spirit of national unity that followed
the calamitous events of Sept. 11, 2001 has dissolved amid rising
polarization and anger." 7 And the report found the country "further
apart than ever in its political values.",8
Andrew Kohut, director of Pew, told John Leo that "the anger level
is so high that if the demonstrators of 1968 had felt like this, 'there
would have been gunfire in the streets."' 9 Compromise has been
demeaned linguistically:
The middle ground, treasured as the key to every election, has
dubious associations. Words such as opportunistic, lukewarm,
compromising and vacuous cling to it. Populist political
4. See infra Part lI.A-B.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. Andrew Kohut, Foreword to PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, THE
2004 POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: EVENLY DIVIDED AND INCREASINGLY POLARIZED (2003), available at
http:l/people-press.org/reports/pdf/ I96.pdf.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Leo, supra note 1, at 66.
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commentator Jim Hightower observes that the middle of the road
is home to yellow stripes and dead armadillos. 0
Gary Dorrien describes the loss of an appealing and principled
Christian middle ground, leaving the religious in the hands of a
variety of radical faiths. "Maverick" congressmen in this polarized
political world are Republicans whose support for Bush reached only
96%, and ticket splitting at the polls has declined." Richard Tomkins
reported the view of the experts he spoke with that "[t]he biggest
impact of a polarized United States . . . would be on Capitol Hill
where changing party demographics and geographics have
contributed to hardening partisanship on and off the floor.
' 12
The Houston Chronicle reported that a Zogby poll "portray[ed] not
only separate nations-the blue states of the upper, outer rim that Al
Gore won in 2000 and the red states of the South and heartland won
by President Bush-but also distinct moral world views."13 And John
White wrote in a much discussed essay, "Not since the Civil War and
post-Reconstruction period has the country been so divided. As we
enter what promises to be a very contentious 2004 presidential
contest, George W. Bush and his Democratic challenger will be
campaigning in two different, yet parallel, universes." 
14
The picture painted by these and other writers display an American
politics very much changed from the tweedledum-tweedledee politics
of the 1950s and early 1960s that Goldwater and many in his
generation decried. So it seems that we have finally gotten what we
wished for though many now dislike the results. The question is how.
Some blame the Bush Administration 15 or the Democrats16 for
10. Dorrien, supra note 1, at 618.
11. Gottlieb, supra note 1, at A6.
12. Tomkins, supra note 1.
13. Mark O'Keefe, A Divide Forms When Politics Battles Religion, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 14,
2004, Religion, at 1.
14. John Kenneth White, E Pluribus Duo: Red State vs. Blue State America: An Analysis of the
O'Leary Report/Zogby International Values Poll 2 (2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author)
(quoted in O'Keefe, supra note 13).
15. See Barbara C. Neff, Bush and God-Talk: Presidential Language Puts Off Some in Religious
Community, NAT'L CATH. REP., Feb. 21, 2003, Nation, at 4.
16. Leo, supra note 1.
[Vol. 25:2
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LAW AND POLARIZATION OF POLITICS
polarizing America. Many writers have focused on the changes in
religious leanings, 17 the culture wars,18  the decisions of political
leaders, 19  other actors in the national political debate, and the
availability of computers.20
If that polarization is the direct result of a variety of national and
international events and campaigns, one could treat variations as
simply a normal part of politics. That explanation is much too simple.
The thesis of this article is that legal changes were an important
contributing factor, however unintentionally, and that those changes
piled on one another sufficiently to have a powerful effect on the
political culture. Whether or not a particular presidential campaign
turns out to be much milder, these factors have a long-term effect in
polarizing politics that will not disappear with a more collaborative
leader. It is important to understand how law is shaping the levels of
bitterness in American politics.
II. How THE LAW CHANGED THE POLITICS
We have rewritten the law of speech and politics to substitute
insanity for milquetoast. For much of the twentieth century, national
media and the political nomination process favored broad appeals to
the public. Following the 1968 Democratic Convention, that changed
for the nomination process. 21 Following the 1976 amendments to the
copyright laws, that changed for the national media.22
17. O'Keefe, supra note 13.
18. Debra Gersh, Promulgating Polarization, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Oct. 10, 1992, at 30.
19. Leo, supra note I (blaming polarization on the left's decision to turn to the courts and the
changes in the Democratic Party since the McGovern nomination in 1972); Gottlieb, supra note 1, at A6
("Under Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich, mainly, the Republican Party decided that the old,
bipartisan ways weren't working for it, that it needed to be more different from the Democrats and more
confrontational.").
20. Gottlieb, supra note I (blaming cable television and talk radio for maximizing their audiences
with "partisan gladiators," computers for highly partisan legislative districting, and interest groups for
"riling up their own supporters" with "[o]verstatement.").
21. See JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 236-59 (1979).
22. Under the impetus of the change in the copyright rules, see 17 U.S.C. §11l(c)-(d) (2006)
(providing for compulsory licensing), the FCC removed its restrictions on broadcast signals that could
be rebroadcast on cable television. See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Report
and Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980). The sequence is well described in DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG & MARK
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A. Legal Changes to the Media
1. The Shape of the Media
A relatively nondiverse broadcasting oligopoly was the result of a
set of official policies dating from shortly after the birth of radio. In
the 1920s, the Department of Commerce under Secretary Herbert
Hoover and the new Federal Radio Commission systematically
stripped universities of their radio stations in favor of commercial
broadcasters.23 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
took over from the Federal Radio Commission in 1934,24 and looked
for middle of the road ownership, though sometimes with political
ties, supporting newspapers, for example, which had supported
Eisenhower's election.25 The Commission prevented unions from
acquiring stations and when a political party that had acquired a
station in the early days of radio applied for renewal, the FCC
announced that stations were henceforth to be apolitical.26 And it
restricted broadcasting to a maximum of three national networks
through a policy known as "localism" in the allocation of station
licenses under which only the largest cities had more than three
27licensed broadcasters. The result was a large set of locally centrist
stations with near monopoly status in their broadcasting markets
contracting with the big three networks for prime time and other
programming.
2 8
D. DIRECTOR, 1983 SUPPLEMENT TO REGULATION OF BROADCASTING: LAW AND POLICY TOwARDS
RADIO, TELEVISION AND CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 72-102 (1983).
23. See 1 ERIK BARNOuW, A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES 96-98, 121-22, 172-74, 218-19, 258-61, 271-72 (1966).
24. The changeover was mandated by the Federal Communications Act of 1934.
25. See LAWRENCE D. GASMAN, TELECOMPETITION: THE FREE MARKET ROAD TO THE
INFORMATION HIGHWAY 74-75 (1994); 3 BARNOuW, supra note 3, at 68-79, 126.
26. On refusal to license labor related stations, see STEVEN J. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
AND THE MEDIA 34, 61-62 (1978). On the F.C.C.'s requirement of station neutrality, see 2 BARNOUW,
supra note 3, at 137.
27. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS, OPTIONS PAPERS, H.R. Doc. No. 95-13, at 45-65
(1977) [hereinafter Shooshan] (memorandum from Chip Shooshan to the Subcommittee on
Communications of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce). The policy is well
described in Neil K. Alexander, Jr., Note, The Local Service Objective and FCC Broadcast Allocations,
in DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING: LAW AND POLICY TOWARDS RADIO,
TELEVISION AND CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 163-68 (1979).
28. See Shooshan, supra note 27, at 55-60; Alexander, supra note 27.
[Vol. 25:2
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LAW AND POLARIZATION OF POLITICS
Vying for a broad audience, networks excluded programming
offensive to any part of their audience. They largely avoided politics
except for the required sale of time to candidates during campaigns 29
and some Sunday news interview programs. Politics as presented was
distinctly middle of the road. Protest songs made the rounds as a
counterculture attack on the war in Vietnam but rarely on the tube.30
The FCC unintentionally reinforced bland TV with the fairness
doctrine. 31 Literally it required broadcasting to provide conflicting
points of view on controversial issues of public importance. Actually
it encouraged broadcasters either to stress conflict or avoid anything
that looked or sounded like a point of view. Points of view required
time for a response to make the opposite point. If the disagreement
bored or antagonized the audience, ratings would plummet,
advertising would leave, and the networks would foot the bill. So
typically they did their best to avoid controversy. This was
particularly true before the media were splintered by cable and the
Internet because the networks shared a large, wide, and diverse
audience and their principle strategic objective, contrary to
29. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2000).
30. See generally 2 BARNOUW, supra note 3, at 271-303 (describing broadcasting coverage of
Vietnam, including, at 287-303, the struggle between broadcasting and the rising counterculture which
developed over the war in Vietnam). For a legal challenge arising from coverage of the war, see Comm.
for the Fair Broad. of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970) (presidential addresses regarding
the war in Vietnam were subject to the fairness doctrine and the stations had not met their obligation of
fairness in response); Complaint by Bus. Executives Move for Vietnam Peace Concerning Fairness
Doctrine Re Station WTOP, Washington, D.C., 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970) (denying petition to require
station to sell time for anti-war ad). See also Yale Broad. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973) (regarding the ambiguity of regulations regarding the playing of songs on
the radio that refer to drugs without regard to whether they supported or opposed their use; this has
become known as regulation by "raised eyebrow").
31. See The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Pub. Interest Standards
of the Communications Act, 89 F.C.C.2d 916, 919-20 (1982). The fairness doctrine had statutory
support in 47 U.S.C. § 315(a), which reads "[n]othing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as
relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news
documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance." Nevertheless, the F.C.C. withdrew the doctrine. See
Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against Television Station WTVH Syracuse, New York, 2
F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987).
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broadcasters' objectives in the current era of niche media, was to
appeal to as wide an audience as possible.
32
The signature moments for national political coverage were in the
1960s. Virtually every American mourned the Kennedy assassination
together on national television. Network news covered civil rights
demonstrations in the South, showing demonstrators kneeling in
prayer in front of courthouses where they were barred from
registering to vote or being attacked with fire hoses when they
marched to protest segregation. That was drama. The national
network audience for these events played a large role in the bipartisan
passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. Later in the
decade the whole country saw dramatic images of riots in America
and carnage in Vietnam. The networks set a national norm by
focusing everyone on the same images, the same ideas, and the same
people.33 The media and its public were hardly amoral for being
centrist, and it had a huge impact on American values and politics.
Beginning in 1976, changes in the applicable law boosted cable
companies. The FCC had sharply restricted cable carriage of
broadcast signals.34 The Copyright Act of 1976 provided for a
compulsory license of broadcast signals on behalf of cable
companies.35 That statute was inconsistent with the Commission's
protection of local broadcasters against the importation of distant
signals. In the wake of that Act, the FCC dismantled its regulations.
36
As cable reached an increasing proportion of American homes,
television viewers soon had many more options than the three
provided by the national broadcast networks. The FCC then finally
32. NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cit. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976); see also
EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE: TELEVISION AND THE NEWS 65-72 (1973).
33. See Michael Robinson, Television & American Politics: 1956-76, 48 PUB. INTEREST 3, 9-39
(1977).
34. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972) (setting out the signal carriage
rules imposed on cable and discussing the relationship to the copyright rules; for example, see 18).
35. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 88-91 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5679, 5702 (on
§111 of the Copyright Act of 1976 creating a compulsory license).
36. Malrite T. V. of N.Y v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1143-47 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. NFL
v. FCC, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982) (describing FCC regulation of cable before the Copyright Act of 1976
and de-regulation afterward, both very much driven by the impact of the status of the copyright rules).
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authorized new broadcast networks.37 In the 1990s the Internet added
yet more options. The viewing audience splintered. Now there was
room for networks with a strong political point of view. The
differences between networks grew. Fox News is not CBS. The
market for the center began to dwindle. Indeed the center may have
become uninvolved, uninterested, uniformed, and smaller. American
politics splintered along with the broadcast audience. Many refer to
civil rights as the "wedge issue" that split the Democrats.38 The
splintering of the media may have been just as important.
A plethora of media outlets could generate a spectrum of views.
The splintering of the media changed the incentive structure within
the newsroom. In the era of three channel oligopoly, broadcasting
avoided angering any part of their audience. In the era of splintered
media, excitement, not inoffensiveness, assumed greater importance.
2. The Law of Irresponsibility
To understand how completely the media have changed, it is
important to understand several other changes in the law of media
liability which have removed both incentive and enforcement for
responsible journalism. There were good reasons to be unhappy about
the law as it stood, but the remedies have substituted a new set of
problems.
The first significant legal change dates from 1964 when several
southern juries were poised to bankrupt the New York Times in a
series of libel cases. In the first to reach the Supreme Court, a
southern jury found the New York Times guilty of libel because of
several minor misstatements in an ad taken out by a group of leaders
of the Civil Rights Movement, misstatements which probably
improved the sheriffs standing in the segregationist community he
was fighting to preserve. 39 The jury reported $500,000 in damages, a
huge sum in the 1960s. That judgment was possible because the law
37. See VINCENT Mosco, BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: INNOVATIVE CHALLENGE AND
ORGANIZATION CONTROL (1979) (discussing the FCC's protection of the three-network broadcasting
oligopoly over the course of nearly half a century).
38. See, e.g., Editorial, The Nuclear Wedge Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at A22.
39. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 258-69 (1964).
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then existing allowed the jury to estimate the damage to the
defendant's reputation, regardless of whether the defendant actually
suffered any financial injury. And a series of cases were poised to
repeat that judgment in a variety of southern towns. The impact on
the New York Times would have been substantial.
The Supreme Court held that misstatements about public officials,
later expanded to public figures, would not result in legal liability
unless they were made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth. Although the decision was intended to protect
freedom of the press, plaintiffs initially took advantage of the
decision to put the behavior of the media defendants under the
microscope, carrying out public investigations of the practices and
paper trails of the journalists, often casting defendants in a bad light
even when they got the story right.4 °
The rule, however, immunizes many misstatements. Some justices
later came to the conclusion that it would have been better to hold the
defendants responsible for their misstatements but limit damages to
provable economic damages.4' Plaintiffs then could sue to clear their
names, but in most cases would have little ability to impose large
financial costs on media defendants. In fact, most libel plaintiffs sue
to vindicate their names rather than for the money.42 As it stands,
however, the rules protect defendants from liability though not from
the expense of litigation defense.
The second major change took place about a decade later and
involved the fairness doctrine, which had required all broadcasters to
provide a balanced presentation of controversial issues of public
importance.43 Failure to satisfy the fairness requirement could result
40. See Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight,
71 IOWA L. REv. 226, 227-30 (1985). But see Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)
(requiring libel plaintiff to prove the falsity of the offending statement, which modified somewhat the
practices Bezanson and his colleagues had observed).
41. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 86 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. John Soloski, The Study and the Libel Plaintiff: Who Sues for Libel, 71 IOWA L. REV. 217, 219-
20 (1985).
43. Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1948); Mayflower Broad. Corp., 8
F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940) (stating that licensee operating in public domain "has assumed the obligation of
presenting all sides of important public questions"). I have discussed the fairness doctrine, and the
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in demerits in broadcasters' files which would be considered when
their licenses came up for renewal. Although nonrenewal was rare,44
broadcasters took that threat very seriously.
In NBC v. FCC, NBC broadcast a documentary called "Pensions:
The Broken Promise." The program highlighted a series of cases in
which pension plans had been abused so that workers were denied
pensions after spending their careers working for a company. The
documentary won awards and was part of the run-up to the passage of
pension legislation in Washington. The specific examples were not
controversial or disputed. But Accuracy in Media, a conservative
watchdog organization, challenged NBC, saying that it had not
broadcast a balanced presentation of whether pension plans in general
were good or bad. NBC responded that nothing in the documentary
addressed that issue, and to the extent that any of the people in the
documentary said anything about that question, their comments were
in fact balanced. NBC argued that the explicit point of the
documentary was that abuses took place and were possible under
existing law.45
The FCC sided with Accuracy in Media and found against NBC.
The network took the case to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
which reversed. For the D.C. Circuit, one could imply a large number
of issues from any given set of facts, but it was not reasonable to
require the broadcaster to address every inference that people might
draw. The documentary as it existed addressed a significant set of
problems and performed a public service. To require the network to
address the inferences people might draw about issues on which the
network did not express an opinion would discourage the network
from addressing significant problems because it would force the
network to either water down an otherwise accurate and hard-hitting
problems with it, at greater length in In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of "Bending"
History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 497, 553-77 (1987).
44. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of
the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 708-11 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Report and Order]
(Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting) (pointing to rarity of adverse findings under fairness doctrine), rev'd in
part, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
45. NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 516 F.2d 1101 at 1180 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
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documentary or run another program to face the other issue. Either
alternative would result in a loss of the already limited audience for
documentaries because of the weaker nature of the documentary. But
the D.C. Circuit approach had the effect of narrowing the doctrine
substantially. Henceforth, only explicit issues would be covered.
Following the circuit court decision and subsequent questions
about the constitutionality of the doctrine, the FCC decided to
eliminate the fairness doctrine entirely. Now there is no requirement
that broadcasters address any issues in a fair and balanced way, and
hasn't been for a quarter century. 46
Several years later, the FCC also withdrew from the comparative
licensing process in which it had chosen who would get a license to
broadcast and who would not, based on a set of criteria that were
supposed to identify public spirited broadcasters who would reflect
the interests and needs of the communities in which they were
licensed to broadcast.47 There had been many abuses of those
licensing procedures; the most blatant involved partisanship. But
beyond partisanship, the FCC for most of fifty years had favored
middle of the road broadcasters all over the country and excluded
minorities of every sort, racial and political.48
Terminating a poorly operating system was certainly overdue. But
it left no responsibility for the quality of broadcasting except
whatever the market would enforce.
46. The constitutionality of the fairness doctrine was questioned in FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 376 n.l 1, 378 n.12 (1984) (indicating that Court is prepared to reconsider the doctrine)
and Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (remanding for consideration of
constitutional argument against fairness doctrine). The FCC has discontinued the doctrine in Syracuse
Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987).
47. Materials on FCC licensing from the 1930s through the 1970s are collected in the first edition of
DOUGLAS GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING 75-334 (1979). For penetrating histories of
licensing and attendant regulation in this period, see 3 BARNOUw, supra note 3; Mosco, supra note 37.
In 1997, Congress authorized random selection for noncommercial educational stations under some
circumstances, 47 U.S.C. § 309(i), and required auctions under most circumstances for commercial
broadcasters, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (j). Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3002, 111 Stat.
258, 260. The FCC subsequently adopted a point system for comparative licensing proceedings for
noncommercial stations in Reexamination of the Comparative Standards for Noncommercial Educ.
Applicants, 15 F.C.C.R. 7386 (2000).
48. See Metropolitan Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (on racial exclusion).
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With the development of the Internet, Congress added, and the
Court expanded, several additional dodges. One says that an Internet
provider is not responsible for information posted on an Internet
service by someone else.49 The courts have interpreted that provision
as excusing Internet services from responsibility for content that they
edit, pay for, or that they refuse to take down even though they are
aware of its errors. The most famous example among those of us who
have followed Internet law involved an Internet posting that directed
people to call a particular person for t-shirts and other memorabilia,
which suggested that he supported and condoned the bombing of the
federal office building in Oklahoma City. As this Internet hoax
spread, he began to receive so many calls that he could no longer
carry on his business, and some of the calls involved threats to his
safety. So he asked AOL to take that hoax down. It did nothing while
the story spread around the country. Eventually he sued but the courts
held that AOL was not responsible. When media investigated and
reported that he had never offered such items, the angry calls
declined to some eighteen per day.5°
Litigation over inaccuracies in the Drudge Report and other
Internet sources have been similarly fruitless, the courts almost
routinely finding that the information was delivered by someone else
so no one was responsible who could be identified, held liable in
damages, or both.51
As a result of the removal of all of these rules and decisions, the
media marketplace has been shifted from a highly regulated market
toward a marketplace that is legally wide-open.
Nevertheless, the current marketplace inherits a configuration of
media businesses that was shaped by the federal government since
the birth of radio and had long favored commercial over public or
educational broadcasting. The Federal Communications Commission
spent half a century protecting the media oligopoly that Hoover had
created. The FCC was finally forced to provide the spectrum that
49. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
50. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). The decision has been very
controversial but nevertheless has been followed by most courts.
51. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998).
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became the basis of the public broadcasting system in the late 1960s.
The bulk of broadcasting is and has always been private, for profit,
and dependent on advertising.
Thus, stations had reasons to avoid politics for their sponsors'
sakes, with some prominent exceptions. News was brief and
editorializing minimal. The networks enlarged news broadcasts in
1960 to counter revelations of rigged quiz shows and respond to the
more aggressive approach of the new FCC chair, Newton Minow.52 It
has often been suggested that dependence on advertising made
stations particularly supportive of American business in less blatant
ways. In fact, broadcasters' biases tended to be from unexamined
stereotypes rather than deliberate manipulation of news.53 When the
era of niche media arrived and the wraps came off both licensing and
content, commercial broadcasting was ready for entrepreneurs whose
objective was to advocate a point of view.
That opportunity meshed with the direction of corporate thinking
over the past several decades. Before he was appointed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, Justice Lewis Powell had prepared a report for the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which he argued that business was
not getting its point of view across. 54 He urged that corporations
organize to present their point of view to the public. Following his
advice, corporate America developed a web of conservative think
tanks advocating economic laissez faire and other conservative
causes. And corporate moguls and religious institutions with a
political purpose established new stations and networks. The
52. 3 BARNouw, supra note 3, at 128 (describing the increase in news documentaries); id. at 181
(describing the very limited time that had been allotted to news). Network news expanded from 15
minutes to a half hour in 1963, see CBS Evening News, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CBSEvening_
News (last visited Jan. 21, 2008).
53. See HERBERT T. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS (1979).
54. Memorandum from Lewis Powell to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), available at http://www2.bc.edu/%7Eplater/NewpublicsiteO5/
02.5.pdf; see also David Harvey, Section One: Political and Economic Dimensions of Free Trade:
Neobalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS 22, 30 (2007) (describing the memo); Zygrunt J. B.
Plater, Law. Media, & Environmental Policy: a Fundamental Linkage in Sustainable Democratic
Governance, 33 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 511, 529-31 (2006) (quoting from the memo).
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enormous media interests of several conservative organizations have
been repeatedly documented.55
In other words, extremism can flourish in a concentrated media
even though there are strong centrist incentives in that environment.
Voices of hate were a strong presence in the concentrated media of
the 1930s,56 before federal regulation gradually tightened. Incentives
are not automatic; people can and sometimes do choose other paths.
But changed incentives matter, even if not conclusively.
Some argue that economic theory teaches that business would not
capture media for political purposes. As Ed Baker demonstrates, that
theoretical economic claim does not necessarily describe actual
behavior.57 One reason is that the rewards available through the
political system can be greater than the loss of revenue from media
broadcasts directly. Particularly, for media embedded in corporate
conglomerates or in diversified financial assets, there can be great
economic benefits from redirecting the course of legislation, by
convincing people to support business claims for deregulation or tax
exemptions, or to support legislators who will direct funds to
business in other ways as well.58
Free market economists also claim that the market is a sufficient
guarantor that misuse of the facts will be punished. The proponents of
this theory ignore the large cost in time, effort, and sometimes money
involved in checking on information. They also ignore the passage of
time. These devotees of the market assert in effect that whatever the
market might eventually bring about, it will bring about immediately,
which is comparable to asserting that there can't be any water above
sea level because, after all, water flows down to the ocean-
eventually. But in a fractured marketplace, there is plenty of room for
55. See, e.g., ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA? THE TRUTH ABOUT BIAS AND THE NEWS
(2003) (documenting the extensive media holdings of The Wall Street Journal/Dow Jones Corporation
and Rupert Murdock's News Corporation, among others).
56. See, e.g., 2 BARNOUW, supra note 3, at 44-51, 221-24; Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
57. ALTERMAN, supra note 55, at 225; C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND
DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS 88-96 (2007); see also C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND
A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994); Frank Rich, All the News That's Fit to Bully, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, §
4, at 12.
58. See KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 326 (2002).
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angry, partisan broadcasters, little way for those who are annoyed by
the broadcasts to object especially where they are not part of the loyal
audience the broadcasters are appealing to, and little way for people
to discover the competing views unless the viewers take the time and
trouble to find out. And by the time any abuse may be discovered,
other issues will have come to the fore.
Bias is not necessarily, or primarily, deliberate. Bias partly flows
from the economics of newsgathering. 59 The media gets a great deal
of its news from government press releases, and particularly from
whoever happens to be president.60 That form of bias follows the
election returns. A second form of bias is the result of unexamined
prejudices and stereotypes.6 ' A third form of bias is the result of
current events. A study that appeared in the neoconservative journal,
The Public Interest, concluded that the news had turned conservative
because of the riots in the middle and late 1960s while the
entertainment media had been liberal because of their concentration
on stories about current social issues. The legal changes outlined
above, however, permit a more organized and deliberate ideological
use of the media.
The result of all these factors is a media that plays less to the
political center and more to the extremes.
3. The Principles of Journalists
Journalism also changed. At the start of the twentieth century, the
penny press sought a mass audience. Advertisers wanted to appeal to
customers without regard to their politics. Opinion was confined to
the editorial page and news took on a hard facts approach, a record of
who said what and what happened where. Joe McCarthy upset that
model by using it too well. By reporting his unsupported allegations
of disloyalty without comment, news media gave McCarthy
enormous influence. In the wake of what we have come to call
McCarthyism, the press looked for ways to report the news without
59. See GANS, supra note 53, at 116-45.
60. Id. at 145.
61. Id. at201-02.
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being so vulnerable to unscrupulous allegations. The newsman's
obligation was to get at the truth, to provide a more carefully digested
record.
There was not supposed to be a liberal or a conservative truth.
Truth was independent of party and partisanship. But inevitably the
news media itself came under attack. Nixon's first vice-president,
Spiro Agnew, attacked the national media as "effete" snobs before
being forced out of office for corruption. Soon the Watergate
investigation triggered by the "investigative reporting" of Bob
Woodward and Carl Bernstein brought Nixon down. The
impeachment was bipartisan. But the reaction to the impeachment
had highly partisan fallout. Many on the right wing of the Republican
Party blamed the press instead of Nixon for his fall.
Journalists increasingly settled on a new paradigm for reporting.
Conflict provided drama, and drama became the engine to sell papers
and win viewers. Get an allegation. Then ask someone on the other
side. Now you have "unbiased" responsible reporting from which no
interested reader can make head or tail. The sides are easier to tell
apart. But the ubiquitous combat storyline contributes to
polarization.
62
As a result, a splintered press, partly freed of responsibility, found
its theme in the maximization of antagonism on paper, screen, and
speaker. That reorienting of press content would be matched by a
reorientation of politics.
B. Legal Changes to the Political System
1. The Nomination System
A century ago, Progressives replaced conventions with the primary
election system for making many nominations.63 The shift to
primaries continued over several decades. That switch has large
political significance. Generally, conventions look for coalitions to
62. See Gersh, supra note 18, at 30.
63. The history of the nomination process is detailed in Stephen E. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of
Association: The Right to Hold a Convention as a Test Case, I1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 191 (1983).
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put people over the top. The political pros that ran conventions had
their eyes on winning the general election. They wanted competitive
candidates. Primaries are relatively divisive, particularly where the
rules award the nomination to the winner of a plurality. The electoral
logic goes further where primaries are not open to independent voters
or to the general electorate but only to party voters. Competing
candidates elected by each party's "base" will be far apart. The late
V.0. Key documented the pressure of primaries toward the extremes
and his work has been repeatedly corroborated since.64 The
mathematics is quite simple. Assume the parties each have close to
50% of the voting public. Victory takes just above half of either
party, and often less, to nominate a candidate who might go on to win
the general election-roughly just over half of a half, or 25% in a
well fought election, and often a much smaller percentage, of the
voting population can control the political system.
The impact of the primary system was largely on state offices until
the changes in the Democratic Party presidential selection rules in the
1970s. 6 5 The Democratic Party reacted strongly to the battles over
black participation in southern state delegations and Mayor Daley's
use of the police to abuse marchers and demonstrators during the
1968 Convention in Chicago, and it determined to end boss control
by substituting more democratic selection systems throughout the
country. In practice this meant a national move to primaries for
selection of state delegations to the national party conventions. In the
wake of those changes, the Republican nominating process changed
as well.
The result of those events was a shift toward more primaries for
both national, state, and local offices. Subsequently, party
conventions rarely decided on the candidates. This second major
64. V.0. KEY, AMERICAN STATE POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 145-65 (1956).
65. On the changes in the Democratic Party candidate selection rules, see DELEGATE SELECTION
RULES FOR THE 1980 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (1978); MANDATE FOR REFORM: A
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PARTY STRUCTURE AND DELEGATE SELECTION TO THE DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL COMMITTEE, reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. 32, 908-917 (1971). CEASER, supra note 211, at
260-303 (describing the changes). On the conflict between state statutes and party rules, see Democratic
Party of the US. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477
(1975).
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round of substituting primaries for other nominating systems had the
effect of pushing both parties away from the center, driven by the
mathematical logic of the primary nominating process. The
percentage controlling presidential selection has to be adjusted
further downward for the impact of specific proportional or winner-
take-all allocation of the votes in state primaries. The controlling
proportion has to be adjusted slightly upward to the extent that parties
allow independents to vote in party primaries. 66
The mathematics of course is equally applicable to Republican
primaries. The dominance of the right-wing Republicans over their
party might have been achieved in other ways. They got their workers
out and into every available party position. But primaries have been
the battle ground between "liberal" and "conservative" Republicans.
The latter dominated several elections even though they never
reflected more than about a quarter of the public.
So the extension of the primary process has tended to deepen the
political divide.
2. Safe Seats
Law drives the political divide in yet another way. The use of
gerrymandering grew substantially after the Supreme Court held
malapportionment unconstitutional in a series of cases in the early
1960s.67  Malapportioned legislatures defined "geographically
protected oligarchies of rural and small-town legislators." 68 But
traditionally defined campaign districts often permitted considerable
66. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
67. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring apportionment of state legislative
seats in proportion to population); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (requiring apportionment of
congressional seats in proportion to population); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding
reapportionment justiciable). Some have ascribed the recent growth in gerrymandering to newer
technology. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 364 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The combination
of increasingly precise map-drawing technology and increasingly frequent map drawing means that a
party may be able to bring about a gerrymander that is not only precise, but virtually impossible to
dislodge.").
68. Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 11, 24-25 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
20081
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 357 2008-2009
) I I S 357 
round f s stit ti  ri ri s f r t  i ti   
effect f pushing t  rti s   t  , t  
athe atical l i  f t  i    
erce ta e tr lli  i ti l t   
further do n ard f r t  i t f ifi  ti l 
take-all allocation of the votes i  state ri ri s.  tr lli  
proportion has t  e a j ste  sli tl  r  t  t    
all  independents to vote in party primaries.66 
he athe atics f c rse is ll  li l  t  li  
pri aries. he do inance f t  ri t- i  li   
art  i t   i  i  t  .  
out and into every a aila le rt  siti . t i i   
the battle ground bet een "li eral"  s r ti e" li . 
he latter do inated se eral l ti s  t   
reflected ore t a  t  rt r  t  li . 
 t e e te si  f t  ri r     
liti l i i . 
2. f  ts 
a  drives the litical i i  i  t t r .  f 
gerry andering gre  substantially ft r t  r  t l  
al apportion ent unconstitutional i  a s ri s f  i  t  l  
1960s. ala rtioned l i l t r  i  hica ly 
protected oligarchies f r r l  ll-t n l i l t rs.,,68  
traditionally efi e  i n i tri t  t  t  le 
66. See Tashjian v. epublican art  f .,  .S.  6). 
67. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Si s, 377 .S. 533 (1964) (requiring a rti ent f t t  l i l ti  
seats in proportion to population); esberry v. Sanders,  . . I ( ) (r iri  rti ent f 
congressional seats in proportion to population); aker . arr,  . .  62) ( lding 
reapportionment justiciable). So e have ascribed the recent gro th i  rr ering t  r 
technology. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 .S. 267, 364 ( ) ( re er, J., issenting) (" he ination 
of increasingly precise ap-drawing technology and increasingly frequent a  r i  eans t t  
party may be able to bring about a gerry ander that is not only precise, but irt all  i ssible t  
dislodge."). 
68. Gordon E. Baker, The nfinished eapportion ent e l ti , i  I I  
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 11, 24-25 ( ernard rofrnan e ., 0). 
19
Gottlieb: Law and the Polarization of American Politics
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
local competition. Gerrymandering, by contrast, is all about political
safety from voter judgment.69
Safe seats are not accidents of politics. Politicians draw safe seats
to protect their jobs and to minimize the seats held by the other party.
Safety is fostered by creating one party districts.70  In one party
districts, politicians are encouraged to move toward the extremes
since there is nothing pulling them toward the center. Nevertheless,
the U.S. Supreme Court has been unwilling to review the
gerrymandering of legislative districts.
71
Gerrymandering creates safe legislative seats, the lack of
competition drives the legislators further apart, and that supports a
very bitter politics. 72 "As a result, members speak more to their
parties' 'bases,' which provide most electoral and financial support."
73
As Samuelson puts it, "stridency is a strategy."
74
That combination of the constitutional revolution against
malapportionment, the subsequent legislative development of the
tools of gerrymandering to write incumbent protection into the laws
69. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 471, (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (referring to "the large percentage of safe seats in recent congressional and state legislative
elections" (citing Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
541, 574 (2004-2005))).
70. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130-31 (1986) (White, J., plurality) ("To draw district lines to
maximize the representation of each major party would require creating as many safe seats for each
party as the demographic and predicted political characteristics of the State would permit."). I have
addressed the techniques of gerrymandering in several articles, including Stephen E. Gottlieb,
Fashioning a Test for Gerrymandering, 15 J. LEGIS. 1 (1988) (urging the symmetry test); id. at 7
(providing a visual description of gerrymandering); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Identifying Gerrymanders, 15
ST. Louis U. L.J. 540, 546-53 (1971) [hereinafter Identifying Gerrymanders] (describing
gerrymandering for partisan advantage as the "selective use of opposing policies" and homogeneous
districting as the tool for creating safe districts). Gerrymandering as commonly described involves both
"stacking" into homogeneous districts and "cracking" opposing votes into mildly diverse districts where
they will be overwhelmed. As the result, both the districts of the dominant and minority parties will
generally be safe ones.
71. Perry, 548 U.S. at 419-20 may signal a change. In response to a brief submitted on behalf of
Gary King, Bernard Grofinan, Andrew Gelman, and Jonathan N. Katz, including some of the country's
leading political scientists, five justices wrote about the concept of symmetry that is the now standard
mathematical measure of the partisan distortion of districting used by political scientists, and the justices
each expressed interest in the potential of the measure.
72. Robert J. Samuelson, Polarization Myths, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2003, at A29; see also
Identi~ng Gerrymanders, supra note 70, at 547.
73. Samuelson, supra note 72.
74. Id.
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shaping their districts, and the Court's refusal to deal with it have
helped stamp stridency on modem American politics.
3. Campaign Money
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, together with other intervening
amendments, were supposed to level the playing field. They may
have done the reverse. And more pertinent here, they may have
intensified the forces driving politics away from the center in two
ways: by decreasing competition and by changing the politics that
flows from fundraising.
The expense of political campaigns has been growing, partly
because of the cost of media, partly because of the increased
importance of primaries, and partly because campaigns are run much
more by and for individual candidates than the party driven
campaigns of yore, and the growing need for money has made
campaign donors a primary constituency of every elected official.75
Political scientists have argued for decades about the importance of
money to successful political campaigns. From their perspective,
campaigns need more funds, not less. They have argued that
restrictions on contributions disadvantage the candidates of ordinary
Americans by contrast to candidates of those with wealth and it
disadvantages challengers by contrast to incumbents. 76 In their view,
that includes the restrictions imposed by the federal campaign finance
restrictions.
77
Incumbents start with a multi-million dollar advantage. They
already have put together their fund-raising machinery, and have
75. See, e.g., LARRY J. SABATO, PAYING FOR ELECTIONS: THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE THICKET 5
(1989).
76. Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
111, 138 (1995) (putting the concept of "floors without ceilings" into philosophical perspective); Frank
J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The Case ofAmerican Campaign Finance, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1358 (1994) (emphasis in the original) (comparing the school of thought among
political scientists "arguing for public funding of campaigns without spending limits on them-for
spending 'floors without ceilings,' as the position has come to be known"-with those of reformers who
are not political scientists).
77. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006).
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publicly financed political staffs briefing them and communicating
with constituents. The press covers incumbents. It does not know
what to do with people who do not hold public office. Congress
provides incumbents with staff, postage, a media center for
interviews, and the ability to provide services for constituents.
Challengers are off stage, hamstrung. Contributors find it wise to
support incumbents because they have the power that contributors are
trying to access. The mantra of the political scientists has been
"floors, not ceilings." That is, they have argued for creating a
financial floor in political campaigns, injecting enough money into
the system so that both sides could get their messages across. But
they have argued against financial ceilings. Ceilings hinder those on
the bottom. The need is to inject sufficient money into the campaign
without pinching what a challenger can come up with.78  So
contribution limits have probably increased incumbent protection
from effective challenges.
79
In turn, incumbent protection insulates the incumbents from the
discipline of the polls and allows them to move closer to their most
important vocal and financial supporters and away from the center of
their districts. To the extent that the federal rules restrain competition,
they contribute to the extremism of American politics.
The federal restrictions may have changed the politics in another
way. As approved in Buckley v. Valeo,8 ° the federal statutes imposed
restrictions on campaign contributions as well as expenditures
coordinated with candidates under the rubric of avoiding
corruption s.8  The statute made funding campaigns much more
78. See GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 194 (1980).
79. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 253 (2006) (Opinion of Breyer, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.
and Alito, J.) (objecting to Vermont's "substantial restrictions on the ability of candidates to raise the
funds necessary to run a competitive election"); id at 264 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing
Vermont's contribution limits as "stifling"); id. at 268 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment, joined
by Scalia, J.) (stating that Vermont's restrictions on contributions "will generally suppress more speech
by challengers than by incumbents, without serving the interests the Court has recognized as compelling,
i.e., the prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof").
80. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
81. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 431-55 (2006)). The limitations are imposed by 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1)-(6) (2006). The treatment
of coordinated expenditures is governed by 2 U.S.C. § 441a(7) (2006) and FEC v. Colorado Republican
[Vol. 25:2
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 360 2008-2009
360   I    (  :  
  ti  
.   
 
    
,  t . 
  
 ts    
  l  
, i s."   
,    
   
  
t  
 r   
   t  
effecti e challenges.79 
I  m,        
   
  f 
 , 
t    
 r 
 leo,80  
ti s i    
   
  1  
 , I  f  ). 
.  ll . ,  . . ,    , .,   , . . 
 lit , .  j ti  t  t'  t tial t i ti   t  ilit   i t  t  i  t  
  t    titi  l ti ; i . t  , ., i  i i  
er ont'  ti    ; id.   , ., i    ,  
, 1.) er ont'  '' ll    
  t , t IVi   
    i  reof'). 
  ). 
. l ign 1, 72) i   
. . .   .  li it ti   i    . . .   .  t t t 
  ) )  . l rado  
22
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss2/4
LAW AND POLARIZATION OF POLITICS
difficult. Campaigns now had to turn to a larger number of people
who could make relatively limited contributions. The increased
difficulty of fundraising guaranteed that those who could accomplish
it, the "aggregators," and large donors as a group, would take on
increased importance. 82
Aggregators come in two flavors. One is the fundraiser typical of
various not-for-profit causes, sending solicitation letters to supportive
groups of people. That kind of solicitation does not bring in very
large individual donations unless it is used to identify people who
might be reached in another way, but successful fundraisers can raise
very large sums from large groups of people, particularly people who
are ideologically driven. These include the voters on both sides of the
"moral issues," and a variety of other citizen causes, both liberal and
conservative. Typically, this kind of fundraising from individual
voters does not raise large sums from those who consider themselves
independent and whose views are "middle of the road." Thus, this
form of fundraising mimics and reinforces the polarization of the
primary process itself.83
The second type of aggregator is an individual who moves among
people of wealth. Those people can consistently give significant
donations and will know others who can do the same. The limitations
of the FECA impose limits on what each individual can contribute to
an individual campaign. But they can be counted on to support many
different campaigns and PACs.84 These people are worth face-to-face
Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001) (applying coordinated expenditure rules to political
parties).
82. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 213, 255 (1989); Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity
to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REv. 837, 838 (1998) (try to circumvent this
problem by requiring anonymous donations). Subsequently, BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING
WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002) made a "patriot dollars" proposal
as a version of the anonymous donation idea and an alternative to public financing of campaigns. For
commentary on their proposal, see Bruce E. Cain, Cheap Talk Citizenship: The Democratic Implications
of Voting with Dollars, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 959, 961 (2003).
83. LARRY SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING ELECTIONS
220-258 (1981), describes the direct mail process and its results. The author also relies on his own
experience doing and working with fundraisers in political, not-for-profit, and educational institutions.
84. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2006) (specifying the aggregate limits for individuals for political
contributions per campaign cycle).
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development and solicitation. Some of them can also make
expenditures and provide varieties of "soft money," which are not
fully regulated by the FECA, even after the amendments of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.85 By necessity, a large
portion of campaign funds have to be raised among a large number of
reasonably wealthy people.8
6
What has become clear is that the very size of this group of
essential contributors drives policy proposals in a different way from
the influence of a smaller group of very wealthy donors.8 7 As the
tables below illustrate, the fundraising enterprise continually pushes
for larger donations from an increasingly large base of large donors.
As Table I makes clear, donations have grown at every level, but
larger donations have grown more rapidly than smaller ones; small
donations have shrunk as a percent of donations; and large donations
have increased as a percentage of donations. Table II makes the same
point by looking at the numbers of people who have made donations
over $200 (the threshold for reporting).88
85. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 202, 116 Stat 91 (2002).
86. See SABATO, supra note 83.
87. Philip Pollock argues that the total group of contributors has remained quite stable over several
decades though the distribution of contributions has shifted. See William Clagett & Philip Pollock,
Changing Modes and Shifting Targets: Monetary Recruitment in the 1960s and the 1980s 3 (Jan. 6,
2005) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association) available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p66989_index.html.
88. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(G) (2006).
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Table 1. Donations by size, year, %
Total* Total* Total* % %
donations donations donations donations donations
$200- $1000- 2$10,000 $200- over
999 9999 999 $10,000
of all of all
$200 >$200
1992 106m 294m 138m 20%/ 26%
1996 165 413 192 21% 25%
2000 174 616 447 14% 36%
2004 265 1004 645 14% 34%
Increase 250% 518% 467% -30% 31%
* Dollar totals are in millions and include both "hard" and "sofi' money. During this period, 1992-2004, the
Consumer Price Index increased 35%.
Source: Figures calculated from figures provided by the Center for Responsive Politics on its website. See
Op.Secrets-org, Donor Demographics, http:/womsecets.org/bigpidonordemogrpics.asp?cyle=
2006 (last visited Feb. 27, 2009), for the relevant years. Note that their figures for most of the years are in the form
$+ and therefore calculating the figures within the relevant ranges required subtacting relevant higher figures.
Numbers are rounded.
Table 2. Donors by size, year, %
Total* Total* Total* % %
donors donors donors donors donors
$200- $1000- $10,000 $200- over
999 9999 999 $10,000
of all of all
> $200 2 $200
1992 273,116 153,198 6,341 63% 1.5%
1996 435,216 235,426 7,215 64% 1%
2000 438,914 324,054 14,919 56% 2%
2004 673,602 441,517 25,833 59% 2%
Change 246% 288% 407% -6% 33%
* Source: Figures calculated from figures provided by the Center for Responsive Politics on its website. See
OpSerets.org, Donor Demographics, httpJ/www.qnseorts.org/bigpitreJdonorderographicasp?cycle
=2006 (ast visited Feb. 27,2009), for the relevant years. Note that their figures for most of the yers are in the form
$+ and therefore calculating the figures within the relevant ranges required subtracting relevant higher figures.
Numbers are approximate and rounded. Totals are in millions and include both "harf' and"soft" money.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to make precise comparisons
between the source and types of contributions before and after the
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FECA became effective because of changes in reporting
requirements. The information we have does confirm that a large
share of political fundraising has long come from relatively
substantial gifts.8
9
To the extent that the federal restrictions have been successful, it
has been by making campaign finance more dependent on continually
enlarging the group of substantial givers and refocusing efforts on
that level of donor rather than the much smaller group, which might
have made megagifts of the kind that cap the efforts of many
nonpolitical not-for-profit institutions. But that has its own political
price.
A few very large donors have very specific requests, and we are
accustomed to thinking of that as inappropriate access and influence,
even when not legally barred. Specific favors that have precise
benefits are insufficient to satisfy the much broader class of people
among whom funds must be raised under the statutory restrictions. A
large group of people whose dollars are crucial to the campaign
requires favors and legislation that affect the economy in a broader
way. Part of the political dynamic behind recent tax cuts, which
reduced the progressivity of the tax code, has been the effort to
solidify the support of this group-still a very small portion of the
electorate but much too large for individual favors.90
Satisfying more people may sound more democratic than the
corruption of specific favors for a small group. But in this form,
money changes the policies, not merely the exceptions. In these ways
the system of financing politics has the effect of driving politics away
from the center and further toward the extremes.
89. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION 512-14 (1979); HERBERT E.
ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 73-85 (1976); see
also ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 48-52 (1960) (the seminal work in the field that
noted that the significance of larger donors depends on the significance of the election).
90. KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 321-27 (2002), suggests the relationship between
the cost of campaigning and the rising tax breaks for the wealthy. DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY
LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH-AND CHEAT
EVERYBODY ELSE (2003) and CHARLES LEWIS & THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF
THE PRESIDENT 2004 (2004) tell a somewhat more traditional story about the benefit to the super rich,
but their data show a curve of benefits of tax breaks so that members of the upper middle class also feel
a noticeable benefit in their taxes though far less than those much more wealthy.
[VoL 25:2
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That can be seen in another way. The individual campaign
contribution limit is now $2,000 indexed for inflation or $2,300 in
2008.91 Few have $2,300 to give to a political campaign. Some,
however, will contribute the maximum allowed to candidates who
support legislation, which will bring large returns to them or their
companies. Those who move in wealthy circles know many people
who can give in those amounts. And each of those donors can give
much more than $2,300 because they can give to many different
organizations so long as they are independent.
92
The more numerous ordinary Americans have much lower
incomes. For most salaried and hourly employees $2,300 is a lot of
money. Typical contributions are closer to $25 or $50. So, while most
candidates will depend on aggregators and large donors, populist
candidates raising money under the federal campaign rules will often
be cash poor.
93
As one political scientist wrote, politicians can shirk their duty in
different ways, and there are competing methods for controlling their
behavior.94 Large campaign contributions threaten to make elected
leaders shirk their duties to the public after the election. But the
absence of competition frees candidates before the election. The two
are related. The more difficult the fundraising process, the more it
91. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(A), 441a(c) (2006). There are a variety of limits for contributions to
different kinds of political committees, and the aggregate statutory limit for all covered contributions is
now $94,000 over the course of two years, see 2 U.S.C. § 441a(3) (2006), indexed for inflation. For the
current inflation indexed amounts, see Federal Election Commission Notice 2007-2, Price Index
Increases for Expenditure and Contribution Limitations, 72 Fed. Reg. 5294 (Feb. 5, 2007).
92. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(l) (2006) (spells out maximum contributions by donee); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(3)
(2006) (spells out maximum aggregative contributions by donor); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(7) (2006) (spells out
the treatment of coordinated expenditures).
93. Some very wealthy individuals like George Soros tried to even the balance by contributing to so-
called section 527 organizations, like MoveOn.org which are exempt under the statute. 2 U.S.C. §
441b(c)(2) (2000); see FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2686 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) (noting the treatment of section 527 organizations). In response,
the Administration tried to subject 527 organizations to the same election campaign rules. The Federal
Election Commission considered rules to prevent section 527 organizations from commenting on the
behavior of candidates. Glen Justice, Finance Battle Shifts to Election Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004,
at A16. But see FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (holding the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) unconstitutionally prohibited at least some issue ads, which
raised doubts about the constitutionality of any limitation of issue ads by section 527 organizations).
94. Gary C. Jacobson, Campaign Finance and Democratic Control: Comments on Gottlieb and
Lowenstein's Papers, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 369, 369-71 (1989).
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threatens to defeat competition, the more large donors and large
fundraisers matter, and therefore gain access and political advantage.
So it turns out that contribution limits matter both before and after the
election.
Political contributions certainly corrupt. And they skew political
discussion further from the center to satisfy the financial base of each
party, emphasizing the particular concerns of major givers, regardless
of the position of the mass of the American public. Contributions
loosen the tie between politics and public opinion. Ours is not a
politics of working people largely because working people cannot
provide the funds that campaigns require. It is a politics that responds
heavily to the "base" of each party, as defined in part by money and
legal restrictions on who can contribute what. Limits on contributions
and expenses at best substitute one inequity for another. They do not
solve the problem.
III. CONSEQUENCES
A. A Perfect Storm
Journalistic conventions which emphasize conflict, media that now
slice the public narrowly in the hands of ideologically driven owners,
gerrymandering that segregates the voting population into safe
districts, primary elections, and campaign finance rules that pass
control to politically active portions of their parties come together in
a bare knuckles brawl of extremists. That is what the papers like,
what people find on their screens, and the way primary election math
adds up. The winners reinforce the point by demonizing everyone
who disagrees. The two parties have become fighting faiths.
We have had fighting faiths before. We had fighting faiths before
the Civil War, our bloodiest, and perhaps holiest, conflict. We had
fighting faiths again during the Populist Movement, when lots of
people died over the union movement, and the beginning of Jim
[Vol. 25:2
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Crow. Indeed, segregation was designed largely to divide the
Populists and keep power in wealthy hands.
95
Whether fighting faiths advance the cause of fairness and justice or
simply bloody the countryside depends. But democracy is in peril
when the objectives of partisanship override respect for those
opposed. To some, times seem perilous when the executive is denied
power that it believes is important to protect the country. To others,
times seem perilous when an executive claims the power to put
people beyond the reach of courts, lawyers, press, public, and family
and hold them there without process or limit; when government
claims the power to invade our privacy and use the information
without accountability; or when government claims we all must be
treated as suspects. Such times seem perilous because power
corrupts, particularly when the techniques of twentieth century
totalitarianism are wielded by those who claim to protect us from
totalitarianism. These arguments reach to the very core of patriotism
and subversion. They pit us against each other as our country's worst
enemies. When totalitarianism comes to this country, it will surely
come dressed in red, white, and blue.
96
B. The Risks to Democratic Government
Half a century ago, American political scientists would have
welcomed greater polarization of the parties to give Americans a
much clearer choice. 97 Half a century later, the entire political
environment has undergone large changes and the effects on the
polarization of the parties seems to have gone too far. For students of
democracy and its history, polarization and intolerance threaten
commitment to democracy.98 And the polarization of the leadership is
95. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 74-83 (1955).
96. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, 61 (George Allen &
Uwin 1976) (1942) (suggests socialism will come from the "very success" of capitalism).
97. COMM. ON POL. PARTIES, AM. POL. Sci. ASS'N, TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE TWO-PARTY
SYSTEM (1951) (urging disciplined parties on a British model).
98. See James L. Gibson, The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and
Political Freedom, 86 AMER. POL. SCI. REv. 338 (1992) (describing the risks of intolerance); see also
James L. Gibson, Enigmas of Intolerance: Fifty Years After Stouffer's Communism, Conformity, and
Civil Liberties (Centre for Comparative and International Politics Working Paper, Version 1.6, 2004),
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even more threatening than the polarization of the masses. 99
Democracy has been brought down repeatedly when competing
partisans came to believe each other disloyal. 00 Both the reality and
the perception are dangerous. Yet members of both parties have been
charging each other with disloyalty or helping our enemies. 101
available at http://jameslgibson.wusti.edu/enigmas/enigmas.pdf; ROBERT WEISSBERG, POLITICAL
TOLERANCE: BALANCING COMMUNITY AND DIVERSITY 185-224 (1998); MICHAEL WALZER, ON
TOLERATION (1997).
99. BERMEO, supra note 2, at 5-6; see also SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES: A CROSS-SECTION OF THE NATION SPEAKS ITS MIND (1955), who first speculated
about the importance of elite attitudes toward liberty.
100. BERMEO, supra note 2, at 168; see also THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES, supra note
2.
101. Attorney General John Ashcroft told a Senate panel: "To those who scare peace-loving people
with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our
national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies." Quoted by Tim
Russert, The Vice President Appears on Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Dec. 9, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/print/vp200l1209.html).
A small sample of reports culled from the New York Times include: Editorial, Will the Real Traitors
Please Stand Up?, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, § 4, at 12 (President Bush described the leak of the NSA
surveillance program "a shameful act" that is "helping the enemy"); Editorial, Talking Sense, at Last, on
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at A26 ("Mr. Bush still declines to even acknowledge the disastrous
condition the war has fallen into, preferring simply to assert over and over that the course there is now
firmly set for a Democratic and stable future. Democrats who question these Pollyannaish projections
are almost instantly slapped down as unpatriotic underminers of military morale."); Editorial, An Un-
American Way to Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2004, at A14 ("We did not, however, anticipate that
those on the Bush team would dare to argue that a vote for John Kerry would be a vote for Al Qaeda.
Yet that is the message they are delivering-with a repetition that makes it clear this is an organized
effort to paint the Democratic candidate as a friend to terrorists .... Mr. Bush has not disassociated
himself from any of this, and in his own campaign speeches he makes an argument that is equally
divisive and undemocratic. The president has claimed, over and over, that criticism of the way his
administration has conducted the war in Iraq and news stories that suggest the war is not going well
endanger American troops and give aid and comfort to the enemy. This week, in his Rose Garden press
conference with the interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, Mr. Bush was asked about Mr. Kerry's
increasingly pointed remarks on Iraq. 'You can embolden an enemy by sending mixed messages,' he
said, going on to suggest that Mr. Kerry's criticisms dispirit the Iraqi people and American soldiers.");
Robin Toner, Kerry Presents Himself as a Patriot With a Different View, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2004, at
A23 ("Mo.,Gen. Johnnie Wilson, one of only four black four-star generals, got a standing ovation when
he introduced Mr. Kerry this way: 'It seems to me unpatriotic that those who were absent would
question Kerry's commitment, dedication and patriotism to our great nation.' The Democrats'
aggressiveness in this debate is, in large part, a reaction to 2002, strategists close to the campaign say.
The Democrats' vulnerability on national security that year, one year after the terrorist attacks, was
embodied by the Senate race in Georgia. Max Cleland, a triple amputee who earned a silver star in
Vietnam, lost that seat to Saxby Chambliss after a lacerating Republican advertising campaign that used
footage of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden to accuse Mr. Cleland of being soft on defense.
'There's a strong feeling among Democrats that in going after Max Cleland, who left three limbs on the
ground, Republicans really crossed a line,' said a Democratic strategist close to Mr. Kerry. 'That upset
John Kerry and a lot of other Democrats."'); Adam Nagourney & Robin Toner, Strong Charges Set New
Tone Before Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at Al (.' It's a fairly common occurrence in wartime
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We think of charges and countercharges of disloyalty as hyperbole,
but they have been corrosive, leading members of competing parties
in numerous countries to believe that winning was more important
than respecting the wishes of the public, and goading each other in a
kind of death spiral until one party seized the reigns. Sometimes that
dance of death was initiated by economic policies, sometimes by
violence, and sometimes both. In other words, polarization at the top
endangers democracy. 1
02
Americans have gone through periods in which they could not in
fact trust each other. The election laws in all of the states reflect
periods when political success was governed by dirty tricks, fraud,
and intimidation. Americans are used to attributing those flaws to
party machines of a bygone era. But the contested 2000 presidential
election brought these issues back to the fore. Invalid absentee ballots
were counted in some Florida counties but not others. 103 The
procedure of voting and the form of the ballots differed by county,
and in those counties that used punch cards, "hanging chads"
(incompletely pushed through the card stock) were scored differently,
a difference the Florida Supreme Court tried to stop until the U.S.
Supreme Court barred it from continuing. 104 A private computer data
that people who dissent are accused of being unpatriotic,' said Alan Brinkley, a historian who is the
provost of Columbia University. 'But to have it come from high levels of this kind is somewhat
unusual."').
102. See BERMEO, supra note 2; THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES, supra note 2.
103. The New York Times conducted an extensive examination of the ballots, with differing
conclusions depending on whether the chads or the absentee ballots were examined, whose ballots, and
in which counties. Their coverage included: Josh Barbanel, Examining the Vote; How the Ballots Were
Examined, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § I, at 16; David Barstow & Don Van Natta Jr., How Bush Took
Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 1, at I; Richard L. Berke,
Examining the Vote: News Analysis; Who Won Florida? The Answer Emerges, but Surely Not the Final
Word, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A16; Richard L. Berke, Democrats Seek Inquiry on Florida Vote
Count, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2001 at Al 1; Richard L. Berke, Lieberman Put Democrats in Retreat on
Military Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 1, at 16; C. J. Chivers, House Republicans Pressed
Pentagon for E-Mail Addresses of Sailors, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 1, at 19; Michael Cooper,
Timely but Tossed Votes Were Slow to Get to the Ballot Box, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 1, at 19; Ford
Fessenden & John M. Broder, Study of Disputed Florida Ballots Finds Justices Did Not Cast the
Deciding Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at 1; Archie Tse, The Confusing Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2001, at Al 6; Ford Fessenden, Ballots Cast by Blacks and Older Voters Were Tossed in Far Greater
Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A17; Ford Fessenden, Examining the Vote: The Method; How
the Consortium of News Organizations Conducted the Ballot Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at
A17.
104. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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company with strong ties to the Republican party was hired without
competitive bidding to purge the Florida rolls of people who should
not vote, but their sloppy process purged tens of thousands who were
qualified, most of them Democrats. 0 5 The counting of ballots itself
was interrupted by a mob of screaming party workers reminiscent of
the goon squads that steered many an election at the turn of the
twentieth century.
Politics in Congress began to show serious cracks. Once they
gained control, Republicans excluded Democrats from many
traditional opportunities to examine legislation, participate in
hearings, or gain access to information. Bipartisanship was gone and
many in Congress reacted to the change in behavior with dismay. 106
Government is all about conflict, sometimes creating it, sometimes
resolving it, managing and mismanaging it, adding fuel to the fire.
Conflict by itself says very little about whether governments will fall
or democracy will be overthrown. How conflict is managed is
crucial. 10 7 Polarization, paranoia, and demagoguery add fuel to the
conflicts among us.
America is not immune from polarization, paranoia, or demago-
guery. 108 Despite an honored tradition of people protesting in public,
mayors, sheriffs, and presidents have filmed, 10 9 hosed, shot,110
105. GREG PALAST, THE BEST DEMOCRACY MONEY CAN BUY: AN INVESTIGATIVE REPORTER
EXPOSES THE TRUTH ABOUT GLOBALIZATION, CORPORATE CONS, AND HIGH FINANCE FRAUDSTERS 7-
12 (2002).
106. See Carl Hulse, With Promises of a Better-Run Congress, Democrats Take On Political Risks,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2006, at A23.
107. See generally AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003) (describes how contemporary international
policies are exacerbating conflicts); SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND
DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR (1995) (describing the inadequacy of the federal arrangements in
the former Yugoslavia to manage the emerging conflicts).
108. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1964).
109. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (finding Army data gathering of domestic
demonstrations did not present a justifiable controversy); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 180 (2004) (discussing of the Army's domestic
"intelligence").
110. Some of the most famous images from the Civil Rights Movement were the use of fire hoses on
the demonstrators. Many were murdered in the context of many different demonstrations and issues.
See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (finding no Eleventh Amendment immunity of state
officials coming out of the shootings at Kent State). For extensive studies of violence in America, see
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arrested, and penned peaceful demonstrators 11' claiming fear of what
the demonstrators might do. The U.S. has been sufficiently moved by
fear of the masses elsewhere to intervene repeatedly against popular
democratic leaders in such places as Guatemala, Chile, and Iran."12
In short, paranoia and polarization are dangerous.
IV. PROPOSALS
The legal regime that centered politics in the mid-twentieth century
required the federal government to take extensive control over the
shape of the media and what it could broadcast. And it required a
political system that privileged closed doors and secret deals. Neither
is defensible any longer. 113 Given that limitation, proposals for
reform can go only part way toward shaving the worst edges off our
polarized politics.
A. Reconstructing Media
The bland media and political oligopoly that existed for much of
the twentieth century had major flaws. We should not return to that
era. But it does make sense to take some steps to bring responsibility,
balance, and fairness back to the media and return politics to a
broader slice of the public.
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 261 (Ronald Gottesman & Richard Maxwell Brown eds.,
1999); VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Hugh Davis Graham &
Ted Robert Gurr, eds., 1969).
111. See Schiller v. City of N.Y., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4253 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2008) (arising out
of police arrest and detention of persons demonstrating outside the 2004 Republican National
Convention).
112. The George Washington University National Security Archive, which is available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/index.htrnl, includes many relevant documents: for Chile, see
Peter Kornbluh, Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup,
Sept. 11, 1973, available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.htm; for Guatemala, see Kate Doyle &
Peter Kombluh, CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents, available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/index.html. For Iran, see STEPHEN KINZER, ALL
THE SHAH'S MEN (2003).
113. FCC restriction of networks and licensing of media ownership may not have been
constitutionally defensible. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Government Allocation of First Amendment
Resources, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 205, 205-07,226-30 (1980).
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Libel laws can be recalibrated so that plaintiffs defamed by media
misstatements can seek vindication without imposing outlandish
damages for innocent mistakes. 1 4  Responsibility for Internet
shenanigans can also be imposed. 15 Courts could impose liability for
those speakers who are paid by their media hosts. A more far-
reaching solution might require congressional development of a fair
notice and take down procedure much as it did for copyright.' 16 And
a modicum of fairness can be restored. 1 7 There were well understood
problems with the fairness doctrine as it once stood."l 8 The D.C.
Circuit put an end to the FCC's inference of multiple issues from
documentaries which did not explicitly deal with them. 119 But that
did not require that the FCC abolish the doctrine in its entirety as it
did. 120 A reasonable version is not out of the question. Fairness
matters.
Public broadcasting can be put on a reliable footing outside the
foundation in advertising that threatens to make each new form of
media duplicate the strengths and weaknesses of existing media.
12 1
114. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 86 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (urging a
limitation to measurable financial damages in place of the narrowing of the liability decision).
115. Courts have disagreed about the proper interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000) (limiting
liability for defamatory content provided by another). Compare Barrett v. Rosenthal, 114 Cal. App. 4th
1379, 1392, 1395 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding immunity does not apply to those who republish with
knowledge of defamatory character), with Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997)
(finding complete barrier to liability despite repeated requests to remove a damaging hoax).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006) (providing protection for copyright holders).
117. See NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 516 F.2d 1101 at 1180 (D.
C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976) (narrowing the fairness doctrine to explicit issues).
118. Its problems are outlined in Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The
Constitutionality of 'Bending' History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 497, 553-71
(1987).
119. The Circuit Court decision in NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1106-07, 1128-29, 1134-46 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976), minimized First Amendment problems by narrowing the
doctrine considerably.
120. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 87-266, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,768
(adopted Aug. 4, 1987).
121. Existing rules leave public broadcasting stations dependent on advertisers differentiated only by
sanitizing the text. See 47 U.S.C. § 399b (2000) (defining advertising prohibited on public broadcasting
stations); Comm'n Policy Concerning the Noncommercial Nature of Educ. Broad. Stations, 7 F.C.C.R.
827 (1992) (differentiating between prohibited advertising and permitted underwriting); KERM, Inc. v.
FCC, 353 F.3d 57, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (describing the relationship of the statutory ban on advertising to
the use of underwriting on noncommercial public broadcasting stations). Prior to the authorization of
underwriting, public broadcasting was supported exclusively from public sources although the search for
a system that would put the stations out of the reach of politics was never satisfactorily resolved.
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Public support is appropriate because news is properly described as a
public good. 122  That is, advertisers are paying for access to
purchasers and are therefore likely to undersupply the news that is
valuable in carrying out the business of democracy. In fact, many
news organizations have been shrinking. 123 Foreign bureaus have
been closed. And even within the U.S. there are fewer reporters
covering more communities. By failing to support the news, the
present set of rules pushes all news givers into the arms of
government press secretaries who supply cheap "picture
opportunities" and canned information, and pushes them into the
arms of economic powerhouses whose patronage or ownership
governs the funding, quantity, presentation and direction of news.
The expansion of Internet, cable, and other media presents a
different set of problems. Social movements often work like
pendulums, shifting backward just as we identify the problems of its
position in the arc. There is some evidence that large media
enterprises are treating the plethora of media outlets like a vacuum to
be filled by a new set of monopolists. 124 So even in this period of
burgeoning choice, it is important to stake out a position on the
antitrust rules. Allowable media concentration should be much less
than the one-sixth of local media outlets or stations with access to
nearly 40% of the national audience that the FCC now allows. 125
Diversity of ownership and viewpoint matters.
122. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1971).
123. Jennifer Dorroh, Armies of One-Are ABC's New One-Person Foreign Bureaus a Model for
Covering the World in the Digital Age?, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Dec./Jan. 2008, available at
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4443 (cites "a time of ever-dwindling resources for foreign news");
Jack Shafer, The Incredible Shrinking Newspaper-Newspapers are Dying, but the News is Thriving,
SLATE, June 24, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2144201/ (newspapers are shrinking but staff is moving
online); Todd S. Purdum, TV Political News in California Is Shrinking, Study Confirms, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 1999, at AI I (television coverage of California gubernatorial race shrank); Editorial, The Last
Anchor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2005, at A18 ("network news operations are less well financed, less
powerful and less likely to send an expensive team of cameras and producers to cover an overseas
story").
124. The fight over net neutrality is an example of this. See H.R. 5417, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006)
(proposal entitled "To amend the Clayton Act with respect to competitive and nondiscriminatory access
to the Internet").
125. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2008).
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Such steps may improve media and limit some of the more
outrageous behavior without returning it to the oligopoly that exerted
a strong pull on politics prior to the revamping of the media over the
past three decades.
B. Reconstructing Campaigns
The path to real campaign reform, reform that would bring politics
closer to the people from the ideologues and the financial oligarchs is
well known. Public financing is the only solution for which there is
evidence. Political scientists have pointed out for years that it was the
one solution that would work. 126 It works by reducing the dependence
of candidates on large contributions and even larger fund-raising
efforts, and by enabling a relatively even-handed and competitive
campaign. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a major
critic of restrictions on fundraising, supports public financing for just
that reason. The U.S. Supreme Court gave public finance of political
campaigns its blessing in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.127 And the court
gave its blessing on expense restrictions as a condition of accepting
public money. Contributions can be excluded entirely for publicly
funded campaigns.
There are two problems with public financing of election
campaigns. First, it would actually work. And therefore it is
unpopular with legislators. True campaign finance reform would
make politics much more competitive. There is no incentive for
incumbents to want that. Incumbents want to protect their positions.
So legislators satisfy our demand for political blood and protect their
own entrenched reelection machine by offering us prohibitions that
can always be circumvented.
Second, it is not free. The federal presidential campaign checkoff
has been purely voluntary and fewer people check it off every year.
We seem to prefer the myth that restrictions on campaign
126. Cain, supra note 76, at 138; Sorauf, supra note 76, at 1358. Cain and Sorauf, in turn, cited the
seminal work of HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL
REFORM 190 (3d ed. 1984); ALEXANDER HEARD, supra note 89; and GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS
OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 31-45 (1983), among others.
127. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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LAW AND POLARIZATION OF POLITICS
contributions will force "bad" politicians to play nice. Our national
distaste of politics prevents us from giving our money to candidates
or doing the hard work required to clean the system up. We are
moralists, not reformers. Underfunding of existing public funding
programs is a serious problem. In the presidential campaign system
as it stands, candidates have the option to decline public money in
favor of private financing if they deem the public funds made
available are insufficient, as has been the case in recent presidential
elections-behavior that ought to trigger an increase in funding but
has not.
Americans are reluctant to pay for public goods like elections.
They want their communications media to deliver news and
information as if it were an important public service, and claim they
want a large quantity of well-organized information about truly
important issues, not just the police blotter and the weather. But they
want it paid for privately by corporations which are very sensitive to
who buys what, among which payments for news are trivial.
Some states have been trying aggressive public funding systems.
128
Public financing would not return politics to the center, but it would
increase the competitiveness of many races and reduce the
dependence on ideologically committed political financiers. To that
extent it could help politics to stand down from present polarities.
128. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 106.30-36 (LexisNexis, LEXIS current through 2008 regular sess.);
Kentucky Public Financing Campaign Act, 1992 Ky. Acts ch. 288, § 13, repealed by Act 2005, ch. 105,
§ 17; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1121-1128 (West, LEXIS current with CHS. 470-560 of the
second regular sess. of the 123d Legislature) (Maine Clean Election Act); Public Financing Act, MD.
CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 15-101 (Michie, LEXIS current through all legislation enacted in the 2008
regular Sess.); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 10, §§ 42-42C (LexisNexis, LEXIS current through Act 377 of
the 2008 regular sess.) (Massachusetts State Election Campaign Fund); id. ch. 55C, § 1-12
(Massachusetts Limited Public Financing of Campaigns for Statewide Elective Office); id. ch. 62, § 6C
(Massachusetts Voluntary Contribution for State Election Campaign Fund); Michigan Campaign
Finance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS Serv. §§ 169.261-265 (LexisNexis, LEXIS current through 2008
Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 32-1602, 1610 (LexisNexis, LEXIS current through 2008 special sess.)
(Nebraska Campaign Finance Limitation Cash Fund); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 17-25-18 to 17-25-30
(LexisNexis, LEXIS current through Jan. 2008 Sess.) (Rhode Island Public Financing of Election
Campaigns); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2810, 2851-56 (LexisNexis, LEXIS current through 2007
adjourned Sess.) (Vermont Campaign Finance Option); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.31 (West, LEXIS current
through 2007 Wis. Act 41) (Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund); see also 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-13 (2006)
(Presidential Election Campaign Fund); 26 U.S.C. §§ 931-42 (2006) (Presidential Primary Matching
Payment Account).
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CONCLUSION
The centrism of the mid-twentieth century was partly the product
of a variety of legal restrictions. As the legal landscape changed,
media and politics changed radically. The law and regulations
governing media organizations gradually relaxed, allowing many
more outlets, with greater ideological diversity, but also a splintered,
ideological, and often irresponsible media. 129 Eventually the FCC
began to allow reconcentration of ownership, but the splintered outlet
niches leave plenty of ideological space.
Liability rules also relaxed for defamation and fairness,
minimizing incentives for diligence in a media system in which most
preach to loyal audiences of like ideological stripes.13
0
This might have been balanced by 1950s style broadly inclusive
political practices. But the expansion of primaries as the route to
nomination privileged more ideological candidates.' 3' The redesign
of legislative districting encouraged that trend. 132 And the financial
contribution rules have helped to align politics with major donors
instead of reducing that relationship as its proponents sought. 133 The
parallel track of communication law and election law could not help
but drive us toward a far more extremist world.
One would not want to bring back 1950s style centrism with all its
faults. But legal reforms are available that could curb some of the
excesses of contemporary politics, particularly with respect to
antitrust rules, defamation, and fairness rules applicable to the media
and regulation of gerrymandering and campaign finance in the
political process.
129. See supra Part II.A.
130. See supra Part II.A.
131. See supra Part I.B.
132. See supra Part I.B.
133. See supra Part I.B.
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